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he recent presidential and early parliamentary elections in Macedonia are only one 
illustration of the country’s long-term political condition: illiberal democracy.  
Illiberal democracies show some capacity to hold an electoral process, yet they fail to 
respect essential political and economic freedoms, or the rule of law.  
Elections in Macedonia might well be categorised as “efficiently administered” (see the 
Statement by the International Election Observation Mission), but there are serious doubts 
about whether they could be assessed as free and fair. Major concerns arise not only about 
the campaigning period and election day, but also about the overall political context in 
which they take place. Besides the interference of the government in the election process, and 
the fact that many state employees served in the election campaign, as reported by the ‘Civil’  
Centre for Freedom, the general tone and recurrent themes of the campaign are alarming. 
Despite the many grave problems facing the country (such as the staggering unemployment 
rate: above 30%), elections in Macedonia have not exactly been a competition of ideas and 
programmes. Instead, both leaders of the running coalition1 have frequently used ethnically 
divisive rhetoric. 
Most importantly, free elections – as a fundamental element of democracy – allow citizens 
who enjoy political and economic freedoms and rights the opportunity to express those 
rights. Otherwise, when citizens are so intrinsically dependent upon and pressurised by the 
government, as is the case in Macedonia, one cannot speak of the ‘free will of the people’. 
Furthermore, it was noted by the NGO Civil that there are several thousand ‘phantom’ 
voters who have no permanent address in the capital, Skopje, and who hold identification 
cards registered to various addresses in the city. This makes the election register highly 
problematic and a source of fraud. Even more alarming is the alleged case of corruption of 
voters for less than 10€ (reported by Civil, which obtained access to video footage of a citizen  
explicitly confirming the bribe). 
Crucially, the organisation of a free electoral process requires respect for freedom of the 
press. But access to media and biased media coverage is a huge problem in Macedonia. For 
example, for all the private broadcasters monitored by the International Election Observation 
                                                 
1
 The conservatives VMRO-DPMNE - Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, the Democratic 
Party for Macedonian National Unity and the Albanian ethnic party, the Democratic Union for Integration, 
DUI). 
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Mission, about 40 hours of paid political advertisements aired were purchased by VMRO-
DPMNE and their presidential candidate, whereas only 3½ hours of coverage could be 
afforded by the opposition Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM). Moreover, 
there was a lack of independent reporting and the media were largely biased in favour of the 
ruling formation. 
 
In view of all these troubling aspects of the elections – fraud, abuse of public resources and 
state institutions, and control over the media – it is difficult to see how the elections could be 
considered democratic and thus a legitimate transfer of power. However, the question arises 
as to whether the results of the elections would be different if the electoral process had 
indeed been genuinely democratic, as the Social Democrats demand, by forming a 
technocratic government and holding new elections. The straightforward answer would be 
“probably not”.  
Such an answer is not (only) due to the efforts of the opposition. The Social Democrats have 
been reflective and innovative as a party, by first bringing reform to their own structure and 
ranks, by opening up their lists to new and younger people who show professionalism, and 
by bringing alleged cases of severe government corruptionto the attention of the public. A 
significant political move was also their nominee for presidential candidate, Mr. 
Pendarovski, who went beyond ethnic divides and nationalist rhetoric and made strenuous 
efforts to gain the support of ethnic Albanians, despite DUI’s boycott and pressure for the 
minority not to vote. DUI’s boycott was an immature reaction to their failed efforts to agree 
with their coalition partner VMRO-DPMNE on a ‘consensual’ presidential candidate, which 
was also the formal reason given to dissolve the Parliament on March 5th and call for early 
parliamentary elections.  
The election results would probably not be significantly different again due to the manner in 
which power has been exercised in Macedonia since at least 2011, when the media most 
critical of the government was shut down on the basis of tax evasion accusations (which 
actually led the Social Democrats to boycott the Parliament and call for the second early 
parliamentary elections since Macedonia’s independence in 1991). Macedonia’s Constitution 
stipulates basic political and economic rights and the rule of law as fundamental pillars upon 
which the country is based (see Art. 1 and Art. 8). However, constitutional liberalism has lost 
practical meaning in Macedonia if we look at the systematic abuse of power and lack of 
accountability and transparency. Notable examples are the opposition being forcefully 
ejected from Parliament during the vote for the budget in December 2012 (see here) and the 
mysterious car ‘accident’ of journalist Mr. Mladenov, in July 2013, who was widely regarded 
as a pioneer of free speech in Macedonia and a fierce critic of the government (see here). But 
everyday examples also include, inter alia: the imprisonment of journalists, the selective 
prosecution of political opponents, police impunity, political pressure and intimidation of 
the judiciary, mistreatment of detainees and prisoners by police and prison guards, the 
government’s frequent restriction of workers’ right to strike, and discrimination against the 
Roma and LGTBI communities (see European Commission’s Report and the US State 
Department Report).   
In this context, it is not surprising that the ruling coalition ‘won’ the elections yet again. It 
remains unclear why the opposition would have consented to early parliamentary elections 
in the first place. Why participate in an electoral process that is merely a theatrical display of 
democracy? What is clear, however, is that the European Union and other international 
actors cannot use (only) the elections as a yardstick of democracy. Another round of elections 
will not address the real and substantial problem of illiberal democracy in Macedonia. What 
is needed is a re-think of the instruments and the manner in which major international actors 
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could and should foster constitutional liberalism in Macedonia. The possibilities for such 
undertakings exist as long as the ‘elected’ government claims its commitment to Euro-
Atlantic integration. But regardless of the specific form such instruments would take, the 
message must be vigorous and clear: take freedoms and rights seriously. This approach does 
not deny that the primary and essential responsibility lies with Macedonians themselves, but 
it calls for support to establish the state’s capacity for the legitimate exercise of power.   
